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THE DEMAND FOR FUNDS AMONG AGRICULTURAL 
HOUSEHOLDS IN THE PHILIPPINES* 
by 
Raquel B. Clar de JeSuS and Carlob E.-CttevaS** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The policies on agricultural credit currently obberved by 
the Philippine government have been widely publicized and 
criticized by borne bectorb. The Shift from concessionary lending 
ratefe to free market rateS, from direct lending to loan 
guarantee SchemeS, and from credit allocation by commodity/Sector 
to the no-loan-targetting Stance taken by the government - haS 
triggered controversy and debate. In the eyeS of moSt of the 
Rural Bankb which depended on cheap government fundS, theSe 
•Paper presented during the ACPC-PIDS-OSU SponSored Seminar-
workbhop on "Financial Intermediation in the Rural Sector: 
Rebearch ReSultS and Policy iSSueS" held on 26-27 September 1988 
at the Cuaderno Hall, Central Bank of the Philippines. ThiS iS 
part of a larger Study on comparative bank analysis jointly 
conducted by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), 
Philippine Institute for Development studies (PIDS) and Ohio 
State University (OSU). The project waS coordinated by Dr. Mario 
B . Lamberte (PIDS) and Dr. V . Bruce J. Tolentino (ACPC). 
••Respectively, Division Chief, Special Study and AnalySiS 
Division, ACPC and Profebbor , OSU. 
The viewb expressed in thiS Study are thobe of the authorb 
and do not neceSSarily reflect thoSe of the Institute. 
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policies are punitive measures for the huge loan delinquencies 
which these Rural Banks accumulated over the past decade. To the 
government and to the general banking sector, however, the policy 
actions are merely in recognition of the lessons painfully 
learned from the country' s. dismal experience with agricultural 
credit programs. 
The general failure of the past agricultural credit 
programs in the Philippines exhibits three important facets: 
(a) the deterioration of the liquidity position of Rural Banks, 
the major supporters of the supervised credit programs; (b) the 
worsening loan repayment problems of farmers; and (c) the 
shortcomingis in the design and implementation of the credit 
programs. 
One of the many inadequacies in the design and 
implementation of the credit programs in question was the 
apparent neglect of an understanding of the demand for funds of 
the intended beneficiaries of the program. The little research 
on this aspect focuses only on the beneficiaries' demand for 
loans and confines the analysis only to credit flows associated 
with the "production needs" of the household. These studies fail 
to consider the interdependence of the household's decisions 
regarding production and consumption, borrowing and savings/ 
investment* 
The credit programs of the past were Idesignea to cater 
solely to the operating capital requirements of the farm 
households. Restrictions were imposed in an effort to ensure 
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that the loans would be channelled to production alone. Credit 
requirements for production were estimated for the intended 
beneficiaries with little attention to the structures of their 
income, assets, borrowings and savings. 
In a household however, decisions on production, borrowing, 
consumption, saving and/or investment are closely interwoven. In 
making credit decisions, farm households also consider their 
"internal funds", i.e. liquidity that can be obtained from 
financial savings or other liquid assets. Consequently, credit 
demand should be analyzed within a framework that considers all 
these interrelated decisions. It should be approached from the 
point of view of the household's total liquidity requirement for 
the financing of all activities, i.e., production, consumption, 
saving and investment. It should not be confined to production 
credit alone. Moreover, the framework should also consider the 
ability of the household for self-finance. 
This paper addresses the interdependency of farm household 
decisions by quantifying a demand for credit that considers not 
only the household's loan needs but its overall liquidity 
position. Section 2 presents the issues raised in the study. 
This is followed by the description of the methodology and a 
definition of variables in Section 3. Section 4 starts with a 
brief discussion of the saving, borrowing and asset structure of 
the sample households, followed by a discussion of the results 
of the empirical analysis of the demand for credit. Finally, 
Section 5 presents the conclusions and policy implications of 
the study. 
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II. MAIN ISSUES 
Several key issues surrounding the interdependent-decisions 
approach are discussed here. First, the controversy about 
simultaneity in farm household models is reviewed. Then a 
preview of the linkages between different components of the 
household's liquidity management is presented. Finally, the 
section discusses the variables likely to influence the demand 
for funds under interdependency of farm decisions. 
Issue_l;_ _Are_Farm Household Decisions Simultaneous? 
The relevant approach in the analysis of farm household 
decisions (i.e., whether separable, recursive or simultaneous) 
has often been a subject of controversy. In the separable 
approach, decisions are assumed to be unrelated and analysis of 
one activity (e.g., production) does not need any rationalization 
of the other (e.g., consumption). It has been used extensively 
because of the ease it provides in econometric estimation. The 
recursive method is also relatively easy to handle empirically 
because the decisions can be "arranged" and analyzed in a 
sequential order, thuis making estimation procedure similar to the 
first approach. 
However, the above approaches are warranted only under 
assumptions of perfect market competition (Singh, Squire and 
Strauss 1986). In LDCs, however, separability or 
recursiveness of farm household decisions are deemed strong 
assumptions given the prevalence of market imperfections. For 
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these economies, therefore, the simultaneous approach in 
analyzing decisions has been suggested (David and Meyer 1979, 
Iqbal 1980). In this approach, activities are analyzed at one 
time since the decisions are assumed to be done simultaneously. 
Why opt for the more complicated simultaneous approach in 
analyzing farm household decisions? Several reasons are 
offered below. 
a. Rural financial markets in. IPCs are _ highly^ imperfect. 
Government policies in LDCs create distortions in formal 
financial markets. Preferential rates, lending quotas, 
rediscount arrangements and special credit programs are some of 
the financial market imperfections in LDCs. Also, lenders in 
these economies are selective in providing credit. Individual 
characteristics of borrowers are regarded as credit screening 
devices by these lenders and may affect the decision of loan 
approval or the size of the loan. As early as 1958, 
Hirschleifer already suggested the simultaneous determination of 
the optimal levels of production, consumption and borrowings in 
cases where the interest rates increase with the scale of 
borrowings. 
b. Actual observations of farm household activities 
indicate the interdependence of decisions. The production, 
consumption and labor activities among farm families are observed 
to be interlinked (Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986) . Production 
activities determine the level of income of a farm household. 
The level of income influences the household's consumption and 
the labor it supplies to the labor market. Moreover, income and 
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consumption levels determine the surplus funds of the farm family 
and their decisions on whether these funds are saved or 
invested. In truly subsistence-level farms, the simultaneous 
approach is strictly required because in these farms, the 
productive activities of the household are basically oriented 
towards the satisfaction of its consumption needs. For semi-
commercial farm-households, decisions can be "separated" since 
the household consumes part of its output, sells the rest and 
supplies some of the inputs and buys the rest. Such separability 
allows the household's decisions to be analyzed sequentially when 
simultaneity cannot be established between certain variables. 
c. Credit iis fungible. Another argument for approaches with 
simultaneity of farm decisions rests on the fungible 
characteristic of credit. Fungibility refers to the 
interchangeability of money (Von Pischke and Adams 1980). 
Because credit may not alwayis be channelled to a productive 
activity, rather, it may be used to finance an activity that 
provides the borrower with the greatest utility (David and Meyer 
1979) , the fungibility of credit supports the uise of a 
simultaneous approach in analyzing credit decisions. 
Issue 2: What patternis characterize the borrywings, savings
r
 and 
assets^of agricultural households in the country? How 
can theise patterns be linked
<
to
§
 their 'demand for funds? 
Patternis regarding the borrowings, assets and savings of 
farmers have been reported by previous studies (TBAC and UPBRF 
1979, TBAC 1981). These patterns reveal limited liquidity among 
farm households because most assetis are kept as fixed and 
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intermediate assets relatively essential to production 
operations. TBAC-UPBRF data for 1975 to 1978 reports that 40 
percent of total assets are in fixed household assets and 30 per-
cent in farmland. The TBAC (1981) study estimated the proportion 
of fixed assets at 70 percent of total assets. In contrast, 
financial assets comprised only two percent of the households' 
asset portfolios (TBAC 1981) . Landowners showed the highest 
levels of total assets and also the highest fixed capital. 
Shar'etenants and leaseholders, on the other hand, tend to 
accumulate farm tools and equipment. 
Bank deposits in the period 1975 to 1978 averaged from only 
F100.00 - ^200.00 per household (TBAC - UPBRF 1979). Most of 
the loans were sourced from banks (about 54 percent of loans) 
and varied in size according to the economic conditions of the 
different geographical areas. 
The studies referred to above had several different 
objectives and their data were collected at a time when the 
credit market was characterized by abundant cheap government 
funds and loan delinquency problems. The financial reforms of 
the early 1980s are likely to have had an effect on the 
financial status of the farm households, and justify a 
reassessment of the status of these households in terms of 
savings, assets and borrowings. The structure of savings, assets 
and borrowings determine the liquidity position of rural 
households and is closely related to their demand for funds. A 
better understanding of the behaviour of farm households may help 
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design future loan programs ind may provide some explanations 
for the failure of past credit programs. 
Issue 3; Giyen the
i
 interdef 5ndency_ _of farm
i
 decisions
 f
 what 
variables influenc -....the deiuand
i [ [
 for,,,,funds
 [
 of 
agricultural households? 
Based on an exhaustive review of credit studies, a listing 
of the different variables which influence credit demand is 
compiled in Table 1 (Clar de Jesus 1988). The review raised 
some reservations on the literature, to wit: 
1. Most of the studies do not consider the interdependency 
between credit and other farm household decisions; 
2. Borrowings are defined as external loans only and do 
not take into account the "internal funds" or self-
financing capacity of the borrowers; 
3. The interest rate variables used do not approximate the 
actual borrowing costs of the borrowing farm 
houisehold. 
This study attempts to overcome these ishor tcomings by 
analyzing the demand for funds in a framework of interdependent 
farm decisions. Also, this study will define borrowings 
considering the household's capacity to self finance its 
activities and the actual borrowing costs will be specified in 
the empirical model. The results of the empirical analysis can 
be used to shed light on the present government policies on 
agricultural lending. 
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Table 1: A LISTING OF VARIABLES WHICH INFLUENCE CREDIT DEMAND 
Relationship 
derived in 
Variables Surrogate previous 
Measure studies #/ 
1 . Interest rate 
2. Initial Endowment 
3. Expenditures 
4. Investment 
Opportuni ties 
5. Transitory Income 
6. Wage Rate 
7. Outstanding Debts 
8. Household 
Characteristics 
- Nominal interest 
rate on formal loans negative 
. wealth/assets negative 
. volume of savings negative 
. ratio of money balances 
to gross farm expense negative 
. total land owned negative 
. capital expenditures/ 
family expenditures positive 
. technology negative 
. capital appreciation positive 
. research expenditures 
in agriculture positive 
. education of Household negative/ 
head positive 
. ratio of gross produc-
tion to value of land negative 
. agricultural wage rate negative 
. outstanding debts positive 
. farm size positive 
. household size positive 
. health index negative 
. dependency ratio positive 
*/ See Clar de Jesus, 1988. 
10 
III. METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
The theoretical approach of this study follows and extends 
1 / 
the model proposed by Iqbal (1980). An important inclusion 
contributed here iis the explicit consideration of the informal 
sector. 
The informal market sector in the Philippines plays a 
significant role in agricultural financing. In these informal 
credit markets, interest rate variations are common. While 
empirical evidence is lacking, it is believed that household 
characteristics are likely to affect the price of credit, the 
approval or non-approval of a loan and size of the loan. In the 
formal sector, even though lower nominal rates may have been 
intended for borrowers of smaller loans compared to borrowers of 
larger loans, the high transactions costs attendant to small 
loans more than offset this differential, thus making the 
effective rates inversely proportional to the borrower's scale of 
operations. This indicates that interest rate's even in the 
formal sector are a function of certain characteristics of the 
borrowing household. 
The hypothesis that the level of borrowings depends on 
certain household attributes which likewise affect the 
interest rates faced by the household implies that both equations 
in the empirical model, i.e., the interest rate equation and 
the demand for funds equation are interdependent, i.e., B = B 
y 
See Clar de Jesus, 1988. 
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(r) and r = r(B). Hence, the analysis uses a two-stage 
simultaneous equation method. 
The following econometric model was specified for the 
analyisiis: 
B = a + a AREA + a W + a IRR + a EDUC + a ORG* + 
o 1 2 3 4 5 
+ a PURPOSE* + a LAND + a RE + a RE + a AGE2 
6 7 8 f 9 i 10 
a TEN + a DEP + Uo 
11 12 
RE = r + r LAMOUNT + r PURPOSE* + r B + r 
f - o 1 2 3 4 
LAND + r PP* + r EDUC + r TENURE* + r 
5 6 7 8 
DIST + U 
1 
RE = s + s LAMOUNT + s PURPOSE + s B + s LAND 
i o 1 2 3 4 
+ S PP* + S EDUC + S TENURE + S 
5 6 7 8 
DIST + r EXPEC* + U 
9 2 
where the dependent variables B, RE , and RE are defined as 
f i 
the level of borrowings, the effective interest rates in the 
formal credit market, and the effective interest rate in the 
informal credit market, respectively. The explanatory variables 
used in the three models are defined in Tables 2 and 3. 
The effective interest rate for each market is simply the sum of 
the nominal annual interest rate (comprised by the principal, 
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Table 2: EXPLANATORY VARIABLES USED IN THE 
INTEREST RATE FUNCTION 
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT SURROGATE ACRONYM EXPECTED 
VARIABLE VARIABLE MEASURE USED SIGN 
Effective 
interest 
rate 
Non transactions 
cost variables 
Loan 
Amount 
Loan 
Purpose 
LAMOUNT 
PURPOSE* indeter-
minate 
Borrowi ng Level of 
Borrowing B 
Household 
characteristics 
Previous 
patronage 
with bank/ 
lender 
PP* indeter-
minate 
Distance 
of bank 
from 
household 
DIST indeter-
minate 
Education 
of house-
hold head 
EDUC indeter-
minate 
Wealth 
Tenure TENURE* 
Total land LAND 
owned 
indeter-
minate 
indeter-
minate 
* Dummy variables which take the value of: 
1 if the purpose for the loan is production, 0 otherwise; 
1 if the respondent is a previous bank patron, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent is a landowner, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3: EXPLANATORY VARIABLES USED IN THE DEMAND FOR 
FUNDS EQUATION 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
SURROGATE 
MEASURE 
ACRONYM EXPECTED 
USED SIGN 
Level 
of 
borrowing 
Initial 
Endowment 
Current wage 
Investment 
opportunity 
meaSureS 
Area 
cultivated 
Average agricul-
tural wage rate 
Total 
irrigated 
area 
AREA 
W ambiguoub 
IRR + 
Education of head EDUC + 
Membership in farm 
organization ORG* + 
Expectation of EXPEC* + 
better income 
CoSt of 
Borrowing 
Household 
characte-
r i s t i c s 
Effective 
interest 
rate 
Age of 
household 
head 
REF/REI ambiguous 
AGE indeter-
minate 
Dependency 
ratio 
DEP 
* Dummy variables which take the value of: 
1 if a member of a farm organization, 0 otherwise; 
1 if the household expects better income in the coming 
year, 0 otherwise. 
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service and other charges made by the bank), and the annualized 
peso value of the total borrowing coists incurred during the 
transactions for a loan (e.g. transportation cost, bribes, cash 
and peso value of non cash outlayis) expresised ak a proportion to 
the loan amount. 
The definition of effective interest rate in this study may 
not be consistent with Abiad, Graham and Cuevas (1988). While 
the opportunity cost of time which should rightfully be included 
in the definition of effective interest rates was included in the 
Abiad, Graham and Cuevas study, this variable was not included in 
the present study due to time constraints. An attempt, however, 
is being made to include the variable in the analysis, the 
results for which shall be reported in a forthcoming paper. 
As indicated above, the level of borrowings is defined to 
consider net changes in external borrowing, external lending, 
financial assets and the value of household assets. Thus, B 
representis the net demand for funds and is defined as follows: 
B = EB - EL - FA - CD 
where EB = external borrowings 
EL = external lending 
-CD = net change in the value of consumer durables 
-FA = net change in the value of financial assets 
The amount of external borrowing of the farm family (EB) 
is obtained by examining the amount of external loans from both 
formal and informal sources received by the household at the 
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start of the year and the amount of its outstanding loan at the 
end of the year. For each loan isource, external borrowing 
is measured as: 
a. equal to the outstanding balance of the loan (EB = 
loans outstanding) if the loans were made in 1986 and 
the outstanding balances at year end is not equal to 
zero; 
b. equal to zero (EB = 0) if the loans were made in 1986 
but were fully paid by the end of the year; 
c. equal to the total loans outstanding at year end (EB = 
loans outstanding) if the loans were received prior to 
1986 and the amount received is greater than the 
amount outstanding. This study assumed that payments 
for the loan were made in 1986. 
The sum of external borrowing from both sectors (formal and 
informal) comprises the external borrowing component of the total 
demand for funds of an agricultural household. 
External Lending (EL) refers to the loans granted by the 
farm-household to others. Because of data limitations, several 
assumptions were made in measuring the external lending 
component of the total demand for funds. External lending, in 
this study is assumed to be: 
a. equal to zero (EL = 0) if the loan granted by the 
household in 1986 has no amount collectible at the 
end of the year; 
b. equal to the amount collectible (EL = loan 
collectible) if the loan granted in 19.86 has an 
amount collectible not equal to zero; 
Due to data constraints, the outstanding balance of the 
deposits of farm households was used as a measure for net change 
in financial assets (FA). This variable serves as a proxy for 
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increases in financial assets (or positive savings), but does 
not capture decreaises in financial assets (dissaving) . 
Cash outflows on conisumer durables was seen to be the more 
relevant measure for net change in consumer durables of the farm 
family (CD). This is based on the observation that among rural 
households, acquisition of consumer durables is common whereas 
sale of such items is rare. Hence, the istudy assumed that the 
households made no sales of consumer durables during the period 
covered, and total purchases in 1986 were used as a measure of 
net change in consumer durables. 
IV. MAJOR FINDINGS 
The data used in this study came from a survey of 1,057 farm 
households from six provinces in the Philippines. Only 
households with crops as their major production activity were 
2/ 
included in the sample. These households comprised a total of 
472 observations. 
A . On the assets, savings and borrowingis of crop households 
1
 • The asset structures of the.farm families.indicate..an 
apparent accuirifalatiyn of fixed^and intermediate assets.and shows 
lesser
 j
 amyuntis of the
 <
 more
 i
 liquid financial assets (Table 4) . 
About 426 households or close to 90 percent of the total 
households surveyed possess residential lots. More than half 
~ See Clar de Jesus (1988) for a complete description of the 
sample. See ACPC Agenda (Feb. 1988) for a full description of 
the household survey. 
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Table 4: ASSET STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE OF ASSETS 
As of December 1986 
Number Reporting Value of Assets Overall Saaple Average 
Type of Assets 
No. 
% to Total 
Sample 
Total 
Amount 
Average 
Aaount a/ Aaount 
% 
Share 
A. Fan Assets 13,627,800 28,872 52.9 
Farm Land 253 53.6 10,660,250 42,135 22,585 41.4 
Fan Structure 88 18.6 223,001 2,354 472 0.9 
Machinery/Tools 261 55.3 777,741 2,980 1,648 3.0 
Livestock and Poultry 280 59.3 1,825,983 6,521 3,869 7.1 
Crops Inventory 68 14.4 140,825 2,071 298 0.5 
B. Fixed Physical Assets 
House and Lot 426 90.3 9,581,100 22,491 20,299 37.2 
C. Consuaer Durables 362 76.7 1,714,935 4,737 3,633 6.7 
D. Financial Holdings 107 22.7 840,149 21,311 1,780 3.3 
Bank Savings 48 10.2 208,943 4,353 443 0.8 
Non Bank Savings 12 2.5 7,860 655 17 0.0 
Insurance 39 8.3 620,119 15,900 1,314 2.4 
Bonds/stocks 8 1.7 ' 3,227 403 7 0.0 
Total Observations 472 25,763,984 54,585 100.0 
aI Average anount held by those reporting non-zero aaounts. 
b/ Average aiount for all respondents in the saaple (i.e. for the "average household'^. 
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possess farmland. Some 77 percent report ownership of 
consumer durables. Although household possessianis are mostly held 
in fixed forms, an important proportion of farm households 
maintain some assets in more liquid forms such as livestock and 
poultry. These assets could provide the household with the 
funds during periods of income troughs or emergencies. A 
striking contrast is provided by the number of households that 
report financial assets. Only 23 percent of the households in 
the sample maintain financial assets, of which bank savings 
and insurance are the most common. 
2
• Across^provinces, the mean valuesof_the^differen^forms 
of assets_are^consistently higher in Batangais
f
 Pangasinan and 
Iloilo (Table 5). The result is not unusual in the case of 
Batangais considering that among the provinces covered, Batangas 
ranks first in terms of annual gross income and per capita 
income. Furthermore, farmlands in Batangas are valued higher 
because the valuation includes plantation crops to which moist of 
the lands in the area are devoted. 
3. Landowners maintain^ j o r e ^ J a r m assets and consumer 
durables
i
but the values of
<
_
j-
these
i
 assets are ' not as large as 
those_ kept by leaseholders (Table 6). Landowners have the 
strongest incentive to increase income from production which is 
tranislated through increased investment in the farm. 
Leaiseholders, on the other hand, because of the temporary nature 
of a leasehold contract, tend to hold higher values of non-land 
farm assets and consumer durables. 
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4. In terms of deposits^ banks .are still preferred over 
informal saving.institutions such as the ROSCA (Table 7). About 
60 households or 13 percent of all houiseholds report 
outistanding deposit balances in either a bank or a non-bank 
saving institution. Of these depositors, 80 percent keep 
their money in a bank while about 20 percent save in an 
informal saving institution. These savers are mostly farmers 
from Pangasinan and Iloilo. The small proportion of savers 
in the province of Batangas may be explained by the fact that 
commerce in the area is fairly active and the labor 
participation of agricultural households is fairly extensive. 
Perhaps, the farm families find theise commercial activities 
more profitable than keeping their surplus funds in a bank 
or in a non-bank savings institution. 
5. The average outstanding deposit in banks of the overall 
sample is F4,353 .00 per household. The deposits.in non-banks 
average only ?655.00 per household (Table 8). 
6. Most of the savers are small landowners and sharetenants 
(Tables 9 and 10). The information on the landowners confirms 
the obiservation that landowners face incentives to produce 
more (and subsequently save more) because they own the land from 
which their income is derived. In the case of sharetenants, 
a similar argument applies. Sharetenants have been accorded 
a special status in this country. They enjoy the same 
protection provided by law to landowners. Furthermore, because 
the tenancy rights are usually passed on through generations of 
6r.ly one family, tenants tend to attach greater value to the 
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Table 7: DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS REPORTING SAVINGS, BY PROVINCE 
As of December 1986 
Proportion to No. of Proportion to No. with 
Nunber Reporting Observations Positive Deposits 
Province No. of Zero Bank Hon Bank Zero Bank Non Bank Bank Non Bank 
Observations Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits 
Batangas 54 47 7 0 87,0 13.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Canarines Sur 89 84 4 1 94.4 4.5 1.1 80.0 20.0 
Iloilo 85 72 12 1 84.7 14.1 1.2 92.3 7.7 
Misanis Oriental 79 72 5 91.1 2.5 6.3 28.6 71.4 
Negros Oriental 76 63 9 4 82.9 11.8 5,3 69.2 30,8 
Pangasinan B9 74 14 1 83.1 15.7 1.1 93.3 6,7 
ALL AREAS 472 412 48 12 87.3 10.2 2.5 80.0 20.0 
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TABLE 8: AVERAGE AMOUNT OF DEPOSIT BALANCES OF AGRICULTURAL 
HOUSEHOLDS, BY PROVINCE 
As of December 1986 
(Values in Pesos) 
No. Reporting 
Deposits 
Average Amount of 
Outstanding Deposits/HH 
Province 
No. 
% Distri-
bution 
In 
Banks 
In Non 
Banks 
Batangas 
Camarines Sur 
Iloilo 
Misamis Oriental 
Negros Oriental 
Pangasinan 
7 
5 
13 
7 
13 
15 
1 1 . 
8 , 
21 
11 
21 
25 
8,121 
4,875 
490 
,816 
,213 
,512 
4 j 
2 
4, 
2 
0 
2,070 
40 
718 
213 
1,312 
ALL AREAS 60 1 0 0 . 0 4,353 655 
TABLE 9: AVERAGE AMOUNT OF DEPOSITS OF AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS, 
BY TENURE STATUS 
As of December 1986 
(Values in Pesos) 
Tenure Status 
No, , Reporting 
Deposits 
Average 
Outstanding 
Amount of 
Deposits/HH 
No 
% Distri-
bution 
In 
Banks 
In Non 
Banks 
Owner 30 50. 0 5,221 195 
Amortising Owner 2 3. 3 2,000 0 
Part Owner 3 5. 0 200 2,096 
Leaseholder 4 6. 7 566 0 
Share tenant 13 21. 7 2,198 1,125 
Others 8 13. 3 8,176 50 
ALL TYPES 
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TABLE 10: AVERAGE AMOUNT OF DEPOSITS OF AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS, 
BY FARM SIZE 
As of December 1986 
(Values in Pesos) 
No. Reporting Average Amount of 
Deposits Outstanding Deposits/HH 
Farm Size 
No. 
X Distri-
bution 
In 
Banks 
In Non 
Banks 
0 - 1.0 hectare 32 53.3 4,397 830 
1.1 - 1.9 hectares 6 10.0 880 150 
2.0 - 2.9 hectares 11 18.3 2,648 584 
3.0 - 3.9 hectares 6 10.0 3,982 0 
4.0 - 4.9 hectares 3 5.0 13,473 0 
5.0 and above 2 3.3 5,000 0 
ALL SIZES 60 100.0 4,353 655 
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land they till. Thus, the tenancy arrangement does not 
restrain them from producing and saving. 
7. Despite relatively higher nominal and effective 
interest, rates.in the informal market
f l
the.data shows,that more 
loans are provided by ^ i nformal. l e n d e r s ^ than. banks and other 
formal lending^ institutions (Tables 11 and 12). Out of 226 
observations that report cash loans (representing nearly half of 
the total sample) only 19 percent were served by banks. The 
bulk or 81 percent were served by relatives, moneylenders and 
other informal lenders. The smaller size of an informal loan 
relative to a formal loan may explain the higher effective rate 
in the informal sector. Small loans (which are sourced mostly 
from the informal sector) bear higher transactions costs making 
the effective rate inversely proportional to the size of the 
loan. 
8. The average size of formal loan to the sample households 
is. about twice ais. large as the average loan granted by private 
moneylenders (Table 13). The average bank loan amounts to 
?5,983.00 per household whereas those provided by informal 
lenders averages J?3,172. 00. 
9. The province of Iloilo.has the largest number, of formal 
and.informal borrowers (Table 12) and, its, banks provide the 
largest loan sizes (Table 13). The average bank loan ranges from 
275.00 (Misamis Oriental) to F7,145.00 (Iloilo). The 
average informal loans, on the other hand, ranges from P113.00 
(Negros Oriental) to F6,214.00 (Batangas) per household (Table 
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13). In contrast, Batangas' informal lenders grant the largeist 
loans. Being the most economically progressive among the six 
provinces surveyed, Iloilo and Batangas offer a wide range of 
productive activities and consumer goods which may account for 
the larger loans that households require in theise areas. 
10• Full_ owners and amortiz ing
[
owners , of.land borrow larger 
amounts than leaseholders^and sharetenants (Table 14). Moreover, 
full owners derive larger loans from formal sources while 
amortizing owners prefer informal sources. This indicates that 
landowners exploit their land to the full and finance their 
production inputs, particularly intermediate farm assets 
through credit. On the other hand, the large loan amounts to 
landowners reflect the banks' bias towards collateralized 
loans since the fully-owned farmlands serve as acceptable 
collaterals. 
B . On the variables that influence the demand for funds. 
The reisults of the empirical analysis of the demand for 
funds are presented in this section. The discussion focusseis on 
three major equations used in the econometric model: the 
demand for funds; the interest rate in the formal sector; and 
the interest rate in the informal sector. 
Two alternative regreissions were done in the analysis. The 
first set, Model 1, utilizes predicted values on interest rates 
for only the non-reporting sample and different variables are 
used to explain interest rates in the formal and informal 
sectors. The second model is a variant of the first, includes 
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borrowing in the interest rate equation, and tenure as 
explanatory variable in the demand for fund. This model uses the 
same variables in both formal and informal interest rate 
equations. The discussion in this section is limited to fetie 
variables with statistical significance. 
B.l The determinants of the demand for funds. 
In the study, most of the variables, to wit: total land 
owned, area cultivated, area irrigated, education, age and 
dependency ratio yielded results consistent with a priori 
expectations (Table 15). Their effects on the demand for funds 
were however statistically insignificant. 
1* Membership in farmyrganization and loan_purpose_emerged 
as^ significant variables in the demand_ for funds equation. Th e 
signs of the parameter coefficients of both variables were 
negative. The results of membership in a farm organization is 
quite surprising. It reduced the demand for funds. It was 
hypothesized in the study that a farm organization may be an 
appropriate venue for technology transfer, information 
dissemination and easier access to credit which may be reflected 
by an increase in the household's demand for funds. The results, 
however, show otherwise. Detailed information for this variable 
is lacking from the data set, but it is suspected that the 
respondents who reported membership in farm organizations were 
able to internally finance their production needs. 
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TABLE 15: THE DEMAND FOR FUNDS OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient T values Coefficient T values 
Intercept -20490.2 -1 .78 -21628.1 -1 .77 
Wage rate -13.5 -0.07 75.0 0.59 
Cultivated area -18763.0 -1 .04 
Irrigated area -818.13 -0.26 
Ratio of irrig. to total 9258.4 1 .21 
Total land owned 18499.9 1 .03 384.4 0.73 
Effective interest rate 
on formal loans 719.4 4.3 * 550.8 4.7 * 
Effective interest rate 
on informal loans 395.0 2.85 * 279. 1 4.1 * 
Membership in farm 
organization -708.7 -2.54 * -267.8 -1 .20 
Loan Purpose -13960.6 -2.34 * -9514.3 -1 .96 # 
Tenure -3644.6 -0.91 -2466.8 0.67 
Education of HH 
o 
2729.9 1 .48 589.4 0.37 
c. 
Age 2.0 1.11 0.46 0.28 
Dependency ratio 4761.0 0.31 3244.9 0.25 
2 
R 0.80 0.84 
F ratio 4.95 6.64 
Model 1 uses predicted values on interest rates for only the non reporting 
sample, dependent variables in REF and REI are not the same. 
Model 2 is a variant of model 1 but the dependent variables in REF and REI 
are the same, cultivated area and irrigated area were excluded in 
the demand equation and replaced with % of irrigated to total. 
* significant variables 
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2. Loans intended, for production tend to reduce the demand 
foi^ funds. The greater risks attached to production loans may 
be reisponsible for the reduction in the demand for funds with 
respect to loan purpose. At first glance, the higher interest 
rates attached to production loans compared to other loan types 
(because of the relative riskiness and transactions cost that 
accompany production loans) may be suspected to cause the decline 
in the demand for funds. However, since the interest rate is 
aliso included in the equation and is therefore controlled for, 
the observed effect may be just reflecting a supply-side effect 
which is specified in the interest rate equation and discussed in 
the next isubsection. 
3
* Interest rates
f
 the moist important variable in this study 
yielded surprising results. This variable was found to influence 
the demand for funds positively. It should be emphasized, 
however, that most of previous studies which established a 
negative relationship between the quantity of credit and its 
price used nominal interest rates in their analysis. The use of 
effective interest rate in this study may account for the 
surprising, positive result. Although the negative effect of 
4 
nominal interest rates on external loans appears to be 
conclusive, the results from this study suggest that the impacts 
of effective interest rates on the demand for funds has yet to be 
established. 
The positive results may reflect the larger effect of 
internal financing (i.e. combined effect of EL, FA, and CD) vis-
h-vis external financing on borrowings (B). An increase in the 
34 
effective interest rate may directly reduce EB. However, it also 
increases the opportunity costs of lending, deposit-making, or 
purchasing consumer durables. Therefore the chances that the 
farm-household will lend to others, make deposits or buy consumer 
durables are lower because these activities are relatively more 
expensive. Thiis is translated through reductions in EL, FA and 
CD by the household and increased internal financing of its 
activities. The combined reductionis in EL, FA and CD may be 
larger than the expected decrease in EB resulting from the 
increase in effective interest rate. The combined effect is 
represented as increases in B (since the signs of the internal 
sources of financing are all negative). 
The same results may reflect, on the other hand, the effect 
of the tranisactions cost component of intereist rate on the size 
of the loan. Loan isizeis may be increased to cover not only the 
actual credit needs of the household but the anticipated 
transactions coist as well. 
Furthermore, the formulation for the econometric model may 
require a more sophisticated specification rather than the 
linear relationship used. Further analysis is thus strongly 
suggested. 
B.2 The determinants of formal and informal interest ratfcs. 
The interest rate equationis provide a number of interesting 
insights into the supply of loans in both the formal and informal 
credit markets (Table 16). 
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Table 16: INTEREST RATE FOR FORMAL § INFORMAL LOANS OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
Formal Informal 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 " Model 2 
Coefficient T values Coefficient T values Coefficient T values Coefficient T values 
Intercept 16.61 2.34 14.32 2.0 -8,2 -0.65 10.31 1.06 
Loan amount 0.0005 0.83 0.0002 0.41 0.0009 1.65 -0.002 -1.29 
Loan purpose 18,52 2.43 * 14.12 1.76 - - 10.80 1.01 
Prev. patronage 26.1 2.84 * 22.3 2.47 * - - -29.8 -2.53 * 
Education of HH -5.69 -2,15 * -3.78 -1.18 - - 3.3 0.86 
Total land owned -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15 - - 0.39 0.34 
Distance of bank 0.37 0.45 -0.14 -0,16 1.24 1.25 -0.36 -0.31 
Borrowings - - 0,0007 2.22 * - - 0.025 3.70 * 
Tenure - -3,13 -0.40 - - 10,2 0.96 
Wage rate - - - - . 0.85 3.71 * 
Irrigated area - - - - 16.18 3.74 * -
Expectation of better Y - - - - -3,98 -0.37 -
2 
Age - - - - -0.005 -1.33 -
2 
R 0.58 0.68 0.66 0.69 
F ratio "4.92 4.51 6.99 4.81 
Model 1 uses predicted values on interest rates for only the non reporting sample, dependent variables in REF 
and RE I are not the same. 
Model 2 is a variant of model 1 but the dependent variables in REF and REI are the same, cultivated area and 
irrigated area were excluded in the demand equation and replaced with X of irrigated to total. 
* significant variables 
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1. The_ effect of.j-Qgn^purpose{which dummies production 
loans) on_ the_ intereist rates^of ^  both^ credit_markets is_^ uniformly 
positive . However
 f
 it_ _ is_ not significant^for the^ _informal 
market. The positive effect of loan purpose is indicating that 
lenders may attach high interest rates to production loanis for 
two reasons: one, the seasonality of production makes loans for 
thiis activity very risky; and second, production loans entail 
greater transactions costs for the lender and the borrower. 
Transactions cost for production to the lender increase because 
of high administration costs. Loan processing requires 
substantial paperwork and extensive inveistigation to establish 
the creditworthiness of the borrower. Once the loan is granted, 
the bank has to frequently monitor the loans through regular 
visits. 
The results further indicate that loan purpose is used as 
a screening device only by the formal lender. Interactions 
between informal lenders and borrowers are more direct and 
personal, hence, information on the purpose of the loan may not 
be necessary to assess the riskiness of the loan operation. 
In informal lending, the variability of total income of the farm 
family matters more than loan purpose. Informal lenders are 
therefore likely to provide loanis regardless of the purpose to 
which these loanis are applied. Furthermore, lo^n purpose may not 
be a crucial factor in informal lending because credit and output 
marketing tie-ups normally exist in these informal credit 
arrangementis. 
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2. T h e ^ result is of Pf fyi?us_ bank^ pat ronage^^ suggest that 
f..^pfr-P^FPP^.gpfl.yp.^j-pg.ft j-gftgFTPir j-rgsL^??!.
1
^.f
roni 
formal^
j
market__and__interest^fate_discounts from the informal 
market. The effect of previous patronage of a bank on formal 
interest rate is positive and significant. The isame variable 
influences informal intereist rates significantly but the 
relationship is negative. A good screening procedure on good and 
bad credit risks among informal lenders is also implied in these 
results. Based on the observation that Filipino borrowers tend 
to repay informal loans first compared to formal loans, "bad 
borrowers" (because of loan defaults) to formal lenders may still 
maintain their good credit standing with informal lenders. It is 
highly probable that the high interest rates offered to previous 
bank patrons for their current formal loans are indicative of a 
penalty for their loan default records. Conversely, interest 
rate discounts provided by informal lenders are "awards" to these 
borrowers for their good repayment record in the informal credit 
market. 
3. Education of the_household h e a d h a s a negative impact 
on formal intereist rates and a positive^and insignificant impact 
on^informal rates. The former reisult suggests that lower rates 
are attached to loans of better-educated borrowers than the less 
educated clients. Thiis result confirms the conjecture that 
education is used as an indicator of managerial capability of the 
borrower by formal lenders. Among informal lenders, however, 
education of the borrower doeis not appear to matter. Personal 
contacts between the informal lender and the borrower suffice. 
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4. The amount of external borrowings increases^the interest 
rate in the formal market and reduces^the rate in the informal 
market. However
 f
 _the _ association^ are weak The effects confirm 
resultis of previous studies that report increases in interest 
rates as the size of formal loan increases. 
5
•
 T
h e effect of wealth
f
_proxied by total_land owned, is 
weak. However, the signs of the coefficient imply that wealth 
reduces interest rates only on loans provided by formal 
creditors. In the informal market, wealth influences the 
interest rate in the opposite direction. Because these variables 
lack statistical significance in both models, the exact 
relationship could not be fully established. 
6
* The
t
 effect_ of borrowing^ (using total^funds concept)^on 
both the
t
 formal and informal interest rates is positive and 
statistically_ significant. The same result is also obtained in 
the demand for funds equation. The results are attributed to the 
transactions cost component of the interest rate and the 
increased self finance (i.e., reductions in EL, FA, CD) 
associated with a smaller EB (the magnitude of which is lesser 
than the combined reductions in EL, FA, and CD) which results 
from the higher effective rate. 
7. Only^58^^percent and 68_percent of
i
 the ^variations in 
formal^_^interest rate
 t
are _explained by the^,twg___models, 
respectively^
p
_while in the^informal market,
i
 6 7 p e r c e n t of the 
variations on effective^interest rates can^be^fexplained by the 
model. 
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V . CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
By redefining the concept of credit demand into a 
comprehensive concept that encompasses the household's full range 
of activities, the savings, investment, and borrowings of 
agricultural households are linked to their total demand for 
funds. 
The empirical analysis specifies a simultaneous equations 
model comprised by the interest rate (price determination) 
equations (supply side) and the demand for funds equation (demand 
side)• The descriptive analysis of the assets structure 
of the household showed a general preference for fixed physical 
assets and consumer durables. Households held a minor proportion 
of their portfolios in liquid financial assets. Where 
financial assets exist, these are mostly in the form of bank 
savings. 
Borrowers are about four times more numerous than savers, 
but unlike the case of depositors who preferred mostly banks 
as depository institutions, borrowers used primarily informal 
lenders when internal funds do not sufficiently finance their 
production activities. 
The explanatory variables with significant effects on the 
demand for funds and the interest rate are summarized in Table 
17. The conclusions are discussed with reference to this 
table. 
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Table 17: EXPLANATORY VARIABLES WITH SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS ON THE 
DEMAND FOR FUNDS AND THE INTEREST RATES. 
Dependent Variable 
Variables w/ 
Reducing 
Effect 
Variables w/ 
Increasing 
Effect 
Demand For Funds 
Formal Interest 
Rate 
Informal Interest 
Rate 
membership in farm 
organization (ORG) 
loan purpose 
(PURPOSE) 
education of the 
household head 
(EDUC) 
previous patronage 
of a bank (PP) 
effective interest 
rate on formal 
loans (RE ) 
f 
effective interest 
rate on informal 
loans (RE ) 
i 
loan purpose 
(PURPOSE) 
previous patronage 
with a bank (PP) 
level of borrowings 
wage rate (WAGE) 
irrigated area (IRR) 
The following concluisions and policy implications can be 
derived from the empirical analysiis: First, on the demand 
side, memberiship in farm organizations emerged as one of the 
significant variableis that reduce the demand for fundis. This 
suggests the ability of farm organizations to finance the 
needs of its farmer-members and the relative efficiency of farm 
organizations in providing both financing and marketing services 
to its members, Thuis, the present thrust of the Philippine 
government towards strengthening existing viable cooperatives 
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3 / 
through access to financing deserves positive attention. 
Second, the significant positive effect of effective 
interest rates reflects the interplay of external borrowing and 
internal financing in the total demand for funds by the farm-
household. It also validates the importance of the total funds 
approach in the analysis of farm-households. The total funds 
approach provides the household with: (a) mobility in the 
source and use of its funds, and (b) flexibility in the 
management of its funds flow. In discussing the first, it is 
clear that mobility of funds allows the household to monetize 
its needs quickly. When effective interest rates increase and 
farm operations are threatened by the low levels of external 
financing resulting from the increase in interest rate, farm-
households can supplement their inadequate funds with 
either EL, FA or CD. Hence, the farm family can maintain 
relative stability in production, income and consumption despite 
effects of unfavorable weather conditions or price fluctuations. 
It can even anticipate risk and adjust cash flows, accordingly, 
so as to maintain the same levels of production and 
consumption. 
The need to promote flexibility in funds flow management is 
also suggested in the results since the farm household is pro-
vided with several options which it can tap in financing its 
_
I 7 
The present government policy of providing cooperatives 
access to the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF) via the 
one-third-guarantee, one-third-equity and one-third-bank 
financing scheme iis an example of this positive attention. 
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activities. This flexibility enables rational choices on the 
type and combination of inputs that would allow farm families to 
maximize profits. Farmers, being rational decision makers, are 
aware of the returns from additional input use and may seek the 
cheapest means of financing their farm operations even if 
these would mean tapping financial assets or converting 
intermediate assets into liquid form. 
Third, the variables incorporating loan purpose, education, 
previous bank patronage and borrowings were found to be the most 
important variables determining the effective interest rates on 
loans to agricultural households. Loan purpose and education are 
used as indicators by formal lenders in screening their 
clientele. Wealth is also a screening device among formal 
lenders but the effect of this variable is very weak. These 
variables are not, however, very crucial in informal lending 
because transactions are more personal and marketing tie-ups 
normally accompany informal lending arrangements. Furthermore, 
the significant effect of borrowings on effective interest 
rates validated the relevance of the simultaneous approach in 
analyzing farm household decisionis. 
Lastly, the study supports the interdependent approach in 
analyzing farm householdis
1
 demand for funds. The approach is 
important particularly because most, if not all, of the 
screening devices used by formal lenders in choosing good credit 
riskis from bad credit risks are lacking in Philippine - farm 
households and secondly, because crop productiori in the country 
is under the mercy of unpredictable weatHer and price 
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fluctuations. Therefore, the approach on rural finance by 
policymakers should be comprehensive and not limited to 
"agricultural credit programs". Policies should foster and help 
flexibility in funds management at the farm level rather than 
impose constraints to it. 
Flexibility in flow of funds breedis rational choices of 
inputs and ' increased profits. This cycle self-perpetuates and 
spurs economic development because the increase in income among 
farm households would generate more surplus funds which,: when 
saved, may be tapped and mobilized by the financial system. A 
rich and robust financial system implies more investments and an 
efficient delivery of more consumer goods and services, 
triggering welfare increases and development. 
The policies of the . government should therefore be geared 
towards the enhancement of funds flows. Policies and programs 
which increase the cash flow of the households, such as risk-
reduction programs, the provision of off-farm income and 
employment opportunities and other measures that will increase 
the cash holdings of farm families and increase the financial 
flows in the community are called for. However, caution must be 
taken on the last measure (i.e., increased financial flowis) . 
Because of the freedom of movement of funds, providing an 
adequate supply of credit to farm households may only substitute 
for the personal or internal funds available! to the household. 
Though such may be favorable from the point of view of social 
welfare, it may do more harm than good to the market because 
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potential inefficiencies in the allocation of funds are 
tolerated. 
Furthermore, in an environment characterized by fragmented 
markets such as those prevalent in developing countries, funds 
flow may be enhanced through measures that reduce fragmentation. 
These measures may come in the form of policies that allow 
freedom of movement (i.e., free market forces), lower 
transactions costs and minimum market constraints (financial 
liberalization). Moreover, approaching rural finance 
"comprehensively" implies that priority must be given to the 
efficient handling of goods and services, particularly farm 
support services like irrigation, infrastructure, etc. rather 
than merely providing access to credit. This can be achieved by 
strengthening government institutions which provide these 
services. 
45 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Agricultural Credit Policy Council. RSM Research Program Design. 
ACPC Agenda Material, February 1988. 
Araujo, P. F. De. "An Economic Study of Factors Affecting the 
Demand for Agricultural Credit at the Farm Level." 
Unpublished MaSter'S TheSiS, Ohio State University, 1967. 
Cafiete, C. C. "The Income Level and Income Distribution Impacts 
of MaSagana 99 Program in Central Luzon, Philippines." 
Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Purdue University, 1978. 
Cordova, V., P. MaSicat and R. W . Herdt. "USe of Institutional 
Farm Credit in Three Locations of the Philippines: 1975-
1977." Unpublished paper, International Rice ReSearch 
Institute, Laguna, Philippines, 1978. 
Clar De JeSuS, Raquel B. "SavingS and investment Decisions of 
Farm-HouSeholdS: Their Implications on the Demand For 
FundS." Unpublished M.S. TheSiS. University of the 
Philippines at LoS BanoS, College, Laguna, Philippines, 
1988. 
David, C. C. and R. L. Meyer. "A Review of Empirical StudieS on 
Demand for Agricultural Credit." Unpublished paper 
presented at the Second International Conference on Rural 
Finance Research iSSueS, Calgary, Canada, August 29-Sept. 1, 
1979. ESO #603, Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Rural Sociology, OSU, 1979. 
DeSai, B. M. "The Relationship of Consumption and Production in 
Changing Agriculture: A Study in Surat District, India." 
Occasional Paper No. 80, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Cornell University, 1975. 
EvangeliSta, F. U. "Short Term Agricultural Credit: An Empirical 
Validation of ItS RoleS in Philippine Farm Households." 
Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation. College of BuSineSS 
Administration, University of the Philippines, 1980. 
FiScher I. The_Theory_of_Interefet. MacMillan Co.: New York, 1930. 
Herdt, R. W . and L. A . GonzaleS. Reaction to "A Study on the 
Benefits and CoStS of MaSagana 99 Program." Paper 
presented at the Fifth National Agricultural Credit 
Workshop, Zamboanga City, March 1981. 
HeSSer, L. F. and E. Schuh. The Demand for Agricultural Mortgage 
Credit. Journal_pf_Farm_EconomicS Vol. 44 N o . 5 (1962). 
46 
HirSchleifer, J. "On the Theory of Optional Investment Decision." 
Journal^of^Pol^t^ica^Economy Vol. 66 No.4 (1958). 
Iqbal, F. A. "The Demand and Supply of Funds Among Agricultural 
Houfeeholdb." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Yale 
University, 1980. 
Ladman, J. R. "An Expanded View of the Demand For Short Term 
Capital." Canadian Journal_of Agricultural Economics 18 
(1972-1974). ' 
LinS, D. A. "Determinants of Net Changes in Farm Real EState 
Debt." Agricultural Economics Research Vol. 24 (January 
1972). 
Long, M . F. "Why PeaSant Farmers Borrow." American_Jpurnal
i
_gf 
Vol. 50 No. 4 ( N o v e m b e r " 9 6 8 " 
Nyanin, 0. 0. "Credit and Small Farmers in South Korea, 1968-
70." Unpublished M. S. TheSiS, Ohio State University, 1978. 
Pani, P. K. "Cultivator's Demand For Credit: A CroSS Section 
AnalySiS." International Economic Review Vol. 7 No. 2 
(1966). 
Pindyk, R. S. and D. L. Rubinfeld. Econometric^ModelS^and 
Economic Forecasts. McGraw Hill I n t e r nation a " Boo k**Company" 
19817 
Pollard, s. "Estimation of the Demand for Credit Among Small 
Farmers in St. Elizabeth, Jamaica: A Production Function 
Approach." Unpublished M. S. TheSiS, Ohio State 
University, 1980. 
Quintana, V. U. "A Study on the Demand for Medium and Long Term 
Agricultural Credit for Small Farmers in 20 Rural Banks." 
5]}^-£i?iiiP£il?J_A3liculturiSt Vol. XLIX No. 8 (1966). 
RoSegrant, M . "Choice of Technology, Productions and Income for 
Philippine Rice FarmerS: Agricultural Policy and Farmers 
Decision Making, 1978." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. 
University of Michigan, USA, 1978. 
Salundaguit, L. T. "Socio-economic AnalySiS of Credit 
Requirements for Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries in Leyte 
Province." Unpublished M . S. TheSiS. UP LoS BanoS. 
College, Laguna, Philippines, 1980. 
Singh, I., Squire, L. and J. StrauSS (edfc.) Agricultural 
I?®JriL £ ? o d £ S *i^ n Sj. o n Sj _ 1 i c a t i on a n d_ Po 11 cy7 John 
Hopki nS" Unl ve r Si ty"Pr eSS"~Ba 11 imor e 7 " 7 s7 A ."19867 
47 
Technical Board for Agricultural Credit. "The Farm and The 
Household: The Microworld of the Farmer." Presidential 
Committee on Agricultural Credit, Manila, 1981. 
and UP BuSineSS Research 
Foundation (TBAC-UPBRFTT "ReSearch Project on the Rural 
Financial Markets in the Philippines," 1979. 
Vergara, S. "The Demand For Medium and Long Term Agricultural 
Credit in the Philippines." Unpublished M . S. TheSiS, UP 
LoS BanoS, College, Laguna, Philippines, 1973. 
Von PiSchke, J. D. and D. AdamS. "Fungibility and the DeSign 
and Evaluation of Agricultural Credit Projects" in Rural 
F^nanc^al^Marketin_Developin r i e te by J. D. von 
PiSchke" 57 wT Adams"and G~. Donald (edS.) John HopkinS 
University PreSS: Baltimore, Maryland USA, 1983. 
Young, R. "Institutional Credit in the Rural Sector: An 
Explanatory AnalySiS of Demand and Supply." Canadian 
o A g r ^ i cu11ur a1_E conomlie S, 1973. 
48 
PIDS WORKING PAPERS 
WP. No. 88-01 A General Assessment of 
Foreign Trade Barriers to 
Philippine Exports. 
Erlinda M. Medatta 
(P23.00) 
WP. No. 88-02 Economics of Upland Re-
source Depletion: Shifting 
Cultivation in the Philip-
pines. Marian S. delos 
Angeles (F23.00) 
WP. No. 88-03 The Size, Financing and 
Impact of the Public 
Sector Deficit, 1975-1984. 
Rosario G. Manasan 
(F17.00) 
W.P. No. 88-04 An Analysis of the Role of 
Pawnshops in the Finan-
cial System. Mario B. 
Lamberte (H4.00) 
WP.No. 88-05 The Financial Markets in 
Low-Income Urban Com-
munities: The Case of 
Sapang Palay. Mario B. 
Lamberte (F26.00) 
WP.No. 884D6 Informal Savings and 
Credit Institutions in the 
Urban Areas: The Case of 
Cooperative Credit Unions. 
Mario B. Lamberte and 
Joven Z. Balbosa 
(F40.00) 
WP.No. 88-07 The Manufacturing Sector 
and the Informal Credit 
Markets: The Case of 
Trade Credits in the Foot-
wear Industry. Mario B. 
Lamberte and Anita Abad 
Jose (P35.00) 
WP.No. 88-08 Japan's Aid to ASEAN: 
Present Realities and 
Future Challenges. 
Filologo Pante, Jr. 
(PI 5.00) 
WP. No. 88-09 
WP. No. 88-10 
WP.No. 88-11 
WP. No. 88-12 
WP. No. 88-13 
WP. No. 88-14 
WP.No. 88-15 
WP. No. 88-16 
The Effect of an Exchange 
Rate Devaluation on a 
Small Open Economy with 
an External Debt Over-
hang. Josef T. Yap 
(P9.00) 
Financing the Budget 
Deficit in a Small Open 
Economy: The Case of the 
Philippines, 1981-86. 
Ma. Socorro S. Gochoco 
(P26.00) 
The On-site and Down-
stream Costs of Soil Ero-
sion. WUfrido D. Cruzj 
Herminia A. Francisco/ 
Zenaida Tapawan-Conway 
^61.00) 
A Review of Policies Im-
pinging on the Informal 
Credit Markets. Meliza H. 
Agabin (F30.00) 
Flexible Functional Form 
Estimates of Philippine 
Demand Elasticities for 
Nutrition Policy Simula-
tion. Agnes Quisumbing 
(P50.00) 
Political Economy of 
Credit Availability and 
Financial Liberalization: 
Notes on the Philippine 
Experience. V. Bruce J. 
Tolentino (PI 5.00) 
Rural Deposit Mobiliza-
tion in the Philippines, 
1977-1986. Rhenee Blanco 
and Richard Meyer 
(PI 7.00) 
Comparative Management 
Structure and Institutional 
Performance in Rural 
Banking Institutions. 
Cesar G. Saldana 
(P30.00) 
49 
WP. No. 88-17 Borrower Transaction Costs 
and Credit Rationing in 
Rural Financial Markets: 
The Philippine, Case. 
Virginia G. Abiad, Carlos 
E. Cuevas and Douglas H. 
Graham. 
(P27.00) 
W.P. No. 88-18 Transactions Costs and 
the Viability of Rural 
Financial Intermediaries. 
Teodoro S. Untalan and 
Carlos E. Cuevas (P24.00) 
W.P. No. 88-19 Credit Rationing Under a 
Deregulated Financial 
System. Ma. Lucila A. 
Lapar and Douglas H. 
Graham (PI3.00) 
W.P. No. 88-20 The Analysis of Savings 
Behaviour: The Case of 
Rural Households in the 
Philippines. Jocelyn Alma 
Rodriguez and Richard L. 
Meyer (P23.00) 
WP. No. 88-21 The Demand for Funds 
Among Agricultural House-
holds in the Philippines. 
Raquel B. Clar de Jesus 
and Carlos E. Cuevas 
(P28.00) 
W.P. No. 88-22 
W.P. No. 88-25 
Funds Transfer Operation: 
Boon or Bane to the 
Viability of Rural Finan-
cial Intermediaries. Julius 
P. Relampagos and Mario 
B. Lamberte (PI7.00) 
The Urban Informal Credit 
Markets: An Integrative 
Report-Mario B. Lamberte 
(PI 9.00) 
WP. No. 88-26 The 1989 Program of 
Government Expenditures 
in Perspective. Rosario 
G. Manasan (PI7.00) 
WP. No. 88-27 A Review of Investment 
Incentives in ASEAN 
Countries. Rosario G. 
Manasan (PI7.00) 
WP. No. 88-28 Science and Technology 
and Economic Develop-
ment. Mario B. Lamberte 
(PI 3.00) 
i •, 
W.P. No. 88-29 The Impact of Trade, 
Trade Policy and External 
Shocks on the Philippine 
Economy Based on the 
PIDS-NEDA Macroecono-
metric Model. 
Winnie M. Constantino 
and Josef T. Yap 
(PI 3.00) 
Copies may be obtained at the: 
RESEARCH INFORMATION STAFF (RIS) 
PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
ROOM 307, NEDA SA MAKATI BUILDING 
106 AMORSOLO STREET, LEGASPI VILLAGE 
MAKATI 1200, METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES 
TELS: 86-574)5 / 8840-59 
 
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs 
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/ 
 
  
 
 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons  
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License. 
 
 
 
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/  
